I don't think the time has come to take that stand. But immediately it was more important to say it to Egypt.
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Ehe British say that when the Americans say this is a matter for the United Nations to settle, they are really just making an ineffectual attempt to ab-. Without suggesting that I accept this view, could I ask for your comment on it? It seems to me that both the British and the Americans are influenced in their attitude to this particular problem.
The United Kingdom didn't have a very happy experience with the United Nations Assembly, to say the least. You would expect them to have a certain feeling of disillusionment and disappointment about the United Nations because of that experience. The United States, on the other hand, found that the United Nations was a most valuable and important international agency to use for this emergency and perhaps as an escape from some of the urgency for immediate national decisions.
They think the United. Nations, for that reason, is a most important and valuable organization. Now, being a Canadian. I naturally find myself halfway between these views. But I think it is equal folly to say that the United Nations Assembly is now under the control of a lot of Asians and Arabs with no sense of responsibility and we must extricate ourselves from it. What we need at the United Nations Assembly is a restoration of AngloAmerican leadership, and that means.
That division reflected itself in other delegations, too. Didn't the British feel, during the last summer, especially since the seizure of the Suez Canal, that America was now taking a new tack in international relationships, that its British and French allies had become regional allies rather than world partners in the old sense? But the immediate cause of the breakdown was the action that the United Kingdom and France took and which got very little support at the United Nations.
It was British and French action in that sense that brought about the immediate collapse of co-operation. But, that had been building up, as you say, over the months. Must it get out whenever Nasser wants it to? We feel that Egypt had the right to be consulted and to agree to the entry of an international force, but having given that consent as she did, she has no right to control the Force, to order it about, to tell the Force when it shall leave.
Where Canada stands in the world crisis
If Egypt is dissatisfied with the operation of the Force, or if anybody else is dissatisfied, or if Egypt wants the Force to withdraw, feels its work is completed, Egypt should make its views known to the Secretary-General who would take it lip with the Committee of Seven and then it would go to the full Assembly, and until the Assembly had decided the Force would carry on. The position 1 stated is, I think, theoretically sound.
But there are several governments participating in the Force. India particularly. But, it is one thing to say that, and another to admit the right of Egypt to take that position. I mean, our bargaining position, which is probably the last one we will have, is running out?
Our bargaining position will decrease as time goes on, perhaps. You are asking me all these questions about Canadian policy and what we think about these things and whether we can do this and whether we can do that. You said a few mo-. I know very well Canada has got a policy, but I did say correctly that this is the thing that is thrown up in political debates on the subject. Perhaps the things you have mentioned were very important, but they couldn't have been worked out if the United Nations hadn't been there, an international organization, to step in. PEARSON: As a system of international political communication, as machinery for the solution of disputes and as a forum for the expression of world opinions.
Can you think of some other example in which the United Nations has performed a real as distinct from a verbal role? On the technical and social. On the political side, in the very first year of the United Nations, if it had not been there it might have been far more difficult to get the Russians out of Azerbaijan Iran ; it might have been much more difficult to bring about Indonesian independence, in circumstances which would not have resulted in a long-drawn-out conflict. They had something to do with the armistice in Kashmir — stopping the fighting and observing the armistice—and also in Palestine and Korea, if you like to talk about that The absence of Russia from the Security Council was the accidental circumstance that made the Korean exercise possible as the United Nations.
But there was an international agency there to take advantage of that accident.
Suppose the Anglo-French action had gone through to a military success. It would be interesting to hear you speculate on what the results would have been. Ell be glad to speculate on that because speculation is an interesting intellectual pastime, sometimes an interesting political pastime. My view— and historians will be arguing about this a hundred years from now, if there are any people left on the planet—my view is that if the fighting had gone on.
[PDF] Pearson s Prize: Canada and the Suez Crisis Popular Colection - video dailymotion
That would have been simple, but they would not have been able to keep control of the Canal without controlling and occupying the whole of Egypt. Earlier the U. This would have meant that Great Britain, which is having a pretty hard time economically and financially discharging its present responsibilities, would have had the occupation of Egypt on its hands. That is one result. Another result would have been, I think, the deep and bitter and prolonged hostility of the whole Arab-Asian world. They would have been so bitter and hostile that some of the Arab states would have been tempted to call in Russian help.
As Sir Winston Churchill once said: when you are. Now, that's two results. I will give you the others. I think the strains and stresses on Asian members of the Commonwealth would have been so great that they would not have been able to withstand them. That's the third result. And then, the fourth result would have been an even greater breach between Washington and London than that which actually existed.
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I accept a certain amount of it. But it is also true that the Far East reflects the Canadian anxiety in foreign policy to work along with both the British and the Americans. And here again we found ourselves halfway between, and by being halfway between we may have done something to bring the two wings closer together.
We play centre on this line. Let me try to explain that. We have not recognized Red China and the British have. Perhaps they wouldn't have if they had waited another six months, because they would have been in the Korean War; but they did and we didn't. So the Korean War had something to do with the determination of policy and dogged that situation for many years afterward. While we have not recognized Communist China, we have not gone along with American policy in the Far East in many of its manifestations, especially over the off-shore islands.
We haven't recognized Communist China and therefore that isn't following the British line. We have been sort of halfway between. One reason why we have not recognized Communist China comes from a calculated weighing of advantages and disadvantages from recognition. I am not talking about the moral aspect, but about the practical aspect — the advantages from recognition against the disadvantages of having a first-class row with the United States over a matter on which public opinion in our own country is strongly divided.
And don't you think opinion in Canada isn t. You should see my mail! It would be a desertion of those countries by giving further encouragement to the Red regime in Peking. They don't want to have anything to do with it. Yemen, and quite a number of others that we recognize. This is not a valid reason for ignoring six hundred million people. How vulnerable are we in Canada to insistence by the United States on a certain amount of collaboration?
Norman, what can we do about it? So we have to take that into consideration when we differ with the United States. The price of disunity is high. Any weakening of the coalition is serious. The Russians fear our unity more, almost, than they do our strength. And I would expect any Canadian government. FRASER: Actually, can it not be argued just as plausibly that Canada is not only no more vulnerable than any other member of the North Atlantic community, but is the least vulnerable of the fourteen? Our relationship is much closer and it would be very hard indeed for us to cut these relations if we wished to.
How could we do that without exposing ourselves? PEARSON: Either to a complete withdrawal of the United States from Canada strategically and economically, or exposing ourselves to American pressures which wouldn't be as friendly as they certainly have been in the past. It was Mexico, not Canada, that was supposed to contain the big oil reserves.
That had something to do with it, the depletion of resources in the United States and the development of resources in Canada for export to the United States, but there are other considerations. The United States may depend on us a good deal for raw materials, but.
Have you talked to the people in the State Department? Have you talked to the members of the National Press Club in Washington? Will they agree with you that Canada is chronically deferential to them down there? They think we cause them more trouble than almost any other friend, and they respect us in spite of or even because of that. What makes you think that the Americans feel that we are deferential to them? I must confess that it is largely over this business of recognizing or not recognizing Red China. PEARSON: if there was a great question of principle involved we would not refrain from recognizing Red China because the Americans didn't want us to do it, or if there was a great question of national interest and national advantage —but is there?
And the reason l think there is is that the American policy toward China is doing exactly the opposite of what its protagonists say it is doing in Asia. It is far from cementing—it is fraying—the ties between the West and the uncommitted nations of Asia. I am not talking about little places like Siam, but India and Pakistan. All the major nations of Asia regard it as a just grievance, not only on the part of China but on the part of Asia, that the United States should be preventing the other Western nations from doing what common sense tells them to do.
This is not an unimportant matter at all in Asia.